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The Farmer's Holiday Association (FHA) was a short-lived 
phenomenon in Depression-era history. It arose out of the 
National Farmers Union, the most powerful farm organization of 
the immediate post-World War I era. While the main goal of the 
FHA was noble, cost of production guarantees were probably 
unattainable. Additionally, the method used try and attain this 
goal was questionable. Furthermore, the movement took on a life 
1 
of its own. For the most part, most of the activities took place 
in western Iowa and eastern Nebraska, with significantly less 
activity taking place in eastern Iowa. 
In this paper, the background conditions and major 
developments of the farm revolts of 1932-1933 will be examined. 
The paper will then go on to document the activities of the FHA 
in eastern Iowa as reported by the major daily paper of the 
region, the Cedar Rapids Gazette. Finally, an examination of 
possible reasons why the withholding movement did not take off in 
eastern Iowa will be made. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Farm Conditions During the 1920s 
2 
The Farmer's Holiday Association can trace its roots back to 
the time period following World War I. Because of the war's 
effects on Europe, there was an enormous increase in demand for 
agricultural products from the United States. To encourage 
farmers to raise their production, the government put price 
supports into effect. As a result, prices for agricultural 
products skyrocketed, especially for wheat and hogs. Farm income 
in the U.S. rose to an all-time high of $16.9 billion in 1919. 1 
Prices were roughly twice their prewar average. 2 
Concurrent to this increased production, land values were 
rising. Much of the increase was attributed to rampant 
speculation, as only a 10 percent down payment would purchase a 
farm. Land prices rose almost 160% during World War I. 3 High 
land prices combined with increased profits made farming as 
prosperous a venture as it had ever been. Many farmers tried to 
plant as much as they could, even to the point of tearing out 
fences in order to plant crops up the edge of the road. 
The highly optimistic spirit of the immediate postwar period 
came crashing down quickly. As Europe recovered, the demand for 
farm commodities abroad diminished. Many countries imposed 
1 Van L. Perkins, The AAA and The New Deal. 1933 (Berkeley: 
University of Chicago Press, 1969), 19. 
2 John L. Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion: The Farmer's Holiday 
Association (Urbana, IL: U. of Illinois Press, 1965), 10. 
3 ibid. 
tariffs which made foreign trade difficult for Midwestern 
farmers. Canada and Argentina began to compete with the U.S., 
especially in the wheat market. Consumer demand for wheat and 
pork in the U.S. also diminished during the 1920s. 
government price supports were lifted in 1920. 
Furthermore, 
All of these factors combined to create headaches for the 
3 
farm community. Supply was high to begin with, and since so much 
land was in production, the situation was exacerbated. Prices 
plunged rapidly; by 1921, gross farm income had dropped to $8.9 
billion. 4 Land prices fell from an average of $57.36 an acre in 
1920 to $35.40 in 1930. 5 
The price issue was not the only concern facing farmers. 
Because credit was so easy to come by during the 1920s and land 
values were inflated, the average farmer debtor had a huge burden 
to carry. The average size of a new loan in Iowa was $11,080 in 
1920, as compared to the national average of $4,270. 6 Iowa had 
1,763 banks in 1920, more than any other state. 7 As prices 
fell, many of the smaller banks closed or began to foreclose upon 
loans. 
In 1929, the markets crashed. Wheat prices dropped from 
$1.03 per bushel in 1929 to $0.67 in 1930, and down to $0.38 in 
1932. Hog prices fell from $11.36 per head in 1931 to $6.14 in 
4 Perkins, The AAA, 19. 
5 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 6 June 1932, p. 6. 
6 Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, 13. 
7 ibid. 
1932, and down to $4.21 in 1933. 8 Other farm commodity prices 
fell in a similar manner. 
The crash of 1929 put pressure on investors. When they had 
to call on their assets, they in turn put pressure on the farmer 
debtors. Many couldn't survive. In 1931, 31.2 farms per 1000 
were foreclosed upon in Iowa; by 1932 the number was 52.5. In 
1933, 78.3 farms per 1000 were foreclosed upon in Iowa, the 
highest rate in our nations history. Overall, the North Central 
region of the U.S. had the highest rate of foreclosures in the 
country. 9 6 percent of farms in Iowa, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota changed ownership through foreclosure or bankruptcy in 
1932, and another 8 percent did so in 1933. 1 0 
4 
The 1920s and 1930s were not a field of dreams for farmers 
in Iowa. They were upset that their purchasing power was down as 
much as 67% from pre-World War I levels. They were frustrated 
that the prices they were receiving for their products was 
sinking fast, while the prices they paid at the market were 
unchanged. 
From Farmers' Union to Farmers' Holiday Association 
The stage was thus set for some type of farm protest 
movement. The roots of this insurgency movement came out of the 
8 ibid./ 12. 
9 Shover, 16; in USDA, "The Farm Real Estate Situation, 
1933-34, 11 Circular 354 (Washington, 1935): 31. 
10 John L. Shover, "The Farmer's Holiday Association Strike, 
August 1932, 11 Agricultural History 39 (1965): 196. 
5 
National Farmers' Union. The Farmer's Union was formed in 1902 
in Texas as an organization of "dirt farmers", and spread rapidly 
north and eastward. It initially appealed to farmers because of 
its secret nature and low dues payments. 
By the end of World War I, the Union's power base had 
shifted from the South to the North, with the largest memberships 
in Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa. At this time, the Union, along 
with all other farm organizations, pushed for and sponsored 
cooperatives as a means of controlling prices. 
After 1929, the Union saw many changes. Two distinct 
factions had developed. The conservatives in the Union advocated 
a continued emphasis on cooperative marketing as a means of 
solving agriculture's ills. A more radical faction led by John 
A. Simpson of Oklahoma and Milo Reno of Iowa advocated a more 
aggressive legislative program, calling for "cost of production" 
legislation, liberal credit and mortgage laws, and government 
issuance of non - interest-bearing bonds. 11 
Of these ideas, the "cost-of-production'' would receive the 
most attention, and become the backbone of the farm protest 
movement. Simply stated, it was the concept that farmers were 
entitled to government aid which would cover the fixed and 
variable costs of production. This was a rather broad concept, 
and as Shover points out, "To compute cost of production, average 
expenses for producers of every commodity would be itemized and a 
11 Gilbert C. Fite, "John A. Simpson: Militant Farm Leader," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 35 (1948-1949): 566-567. 
6 
price determined for products consumed domestically that would 
return to the average operator his costs, labor, and a reasonable 
profit. 12 To attain cost of production in 1932 a farmer would 
have had to received $0.92 per bushel for corn, $0.49 per bushel 
for oats, $0.11 a pound for hogs, and $2.17 per hundredweight for 
milk. Actual prices on the Omaha market at the time were $0.28 
per bushel for corn, $0 . 16 per bushel for oats, $0.04 a pound for 
hogs, and $0.90 per hundredweight for milk. 13 
As conditions on the farm worsened, the battle for control 
of the Farmers' Union continued. The national convention in 
Novembe r of 1930 elected Simpson to be president, thus ensuring a 
shift in policy towards radicalism. The other leader of this 
political offensive, Milo Reno, was to become central in the 
formation of the Farmer's Holiday Association. 
Reno was born in Wapello County, Iowa, in 1866. He was an 
ordained Campbellite minister, which led to his skill in oratory . 
He was involved in rural protest movements for most of his life. 
As head of the Iowa Farmers' Union from 1921-1930, the 
organization grew to about 10,000 members. 14 Despite Reno's 
energy and devotion to his cause, a distinct lack of basic 
economic sense caused his ideas to be doomed from the start. 
Shortly after Simpson came into power, Reno once again began 
12 John L. Shover, "The Farmers' Holiday Association Strike, 
August 1932," Agricultural History 39 (1965): 198. 
13 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 23 August 1932, p. 1. 
14 Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, 25 - 27. 
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to float an idea he first discussed in 1927: a general 
withholding movement of farm products in order to raise farm 
prices and force Congress to enact cost of production 
legislation. Momentum began to build towards some sort of action 
as it became evident that tensions were mounting on the farm. 15 
By 1932, sentiment for some sort of action was building, as the 
pages of the Iowa Union Farmer contained nothing but plans for a 
forthcoming withholding action. 16 On 3 May, 2,000 Union members 
gathered in Des Moines to launch the Farmers' Holiday Association 
nationally. Milo Reno was named president of the organization. 
From the beginning, the FHA and the National Farmer's Union 
were intimately linked by policy. In a way, the FHA was the 
"strong-arm" of the National Farmer's Union. Unfortunately for 
Reno, an efficient chain of command was not established, and he 
did not have a great presence as a leader. This was to create 
confusion from the start of the revolts. 
The Farm Revolts of 1932-1933 
The withholding strike was initially slated to begin on 4 
July and last for 30 days. However, organizational plans were 
not in place, and the strike was delayed indefinitely. 
Additionally, prices actually had increased throughout June. 
When prices again began to slump in late July, plans for the 
15 See Frank D. Dileva, 11 Frantic Farmers Fight Law, 11 Annals 
of Iowa 32 (July 1954): 337-364. 
16 Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, 37. 
8 
Holiday to commence on 15 August were set. In the confusion that 
characterized the leadership of the FHA, however, the strike 
commenced at Sioux City on August 8, and the leadership was 
forced to announce two days later that the strike was underway. 
As Shover states, "The farm strike that began at Sioux 
City ... was a different movement from that planned by the Farmers' 
Holiday Association. In all the preceding buildup there had been 
no mention of picketing, yet at the very inception of the 
withholding movement farmers in Woodbury and Plymouth counties 
patrolled highways and threatened noncooperating farmers who 
tried to market their produce. "17 Even from day one, it became 
obvious that the Farmers' Holiday was two movements. One was the 
formal organization which planned a peaceful withholding movement 
to bring pressure for cost of production legislation. The other 
was a spontaneous social movement which was triggered into action 
by the Holiday but was looking for immediate remedies instead. 18 
The activities which took place in regards to the strike in 
the western portion of Iowa and eastern Nebraska are well-
documented, and this paper will not go into great detail here. 19 
The majority of the activity and violence associated with the 
17 Shover, 11 Farmers' Holiday Strike", 198. 
18 ibid., 199. 
19 See Howard W. Lawrence, "The Farmers' Holiday Association 
in Iowa, 1932-1933" (M.A. Thesis, State University of Iowa, 
1952); Julius Korgan, "Farmers Picket the Depression" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, American University, 1961); John L. Shover, "The 
Farm Holiday Movement in Nebraska," Nebraska History 43 (March 
1962): 53 - 78; ibid., "The Farmers' Holiday Association Strike, 
August 1932," Agricultural History 39 (1965): 196-203. 
farm revolts of 1932-1933 took place in the northwest corner of 
the state. The strike involved mainly dairy farmers at first, 
although other farm products became involved later. Of all farm 
products, a milk strike had the largest chance of being 
effective. Milk is highly perishable, and thus the "milk shed" 
was of a small radius around a creamery. Producer numbers were 
small, and could be controlled much more easily with a 
9 
withholding movement than with most other farm products. Indeed, 
the milk dispute in Sioux City was settled after ten days when 
distributors agreed to compromise on a price increase. Other 
major problems erupted in Council Bluffs, Cherokee, and Clinton. 
After almost a month of violence and chaos, a truce was 
declared on 1 September. The withholding movement had been a 
failure, even in the areas of highest activity. Only at Sioux 
City had receipts of livestock decreased. What Reno had failed 
to realize was that blockading only a few markets would not 
reduce supply sufficiently enough to raise prices. All 
agricultural products would have to be withheld to make the 
movement effective. Farmers could not afford to participate in 
an embargo which deprived them of all income. In essence, the 
formal withholding movement was doomed from the start. 
The FHA changed focus in 1933, turning towards the halting 
of foreclosures through so-called ''penny auctions", where farmers 
would come to foreclosure auctions, discourage any legitimate 
bidders, and then buy items for one penny. The farmers would 
then give the merchandise back the farmer being foreclosed upon. 
10 
In all actuality, the FHA probably had its greatest success in 
this function, as an estimated 140 foreclosure sales were halted 
in this manner. 20 
Towards the end of 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was 
in the middle of instituting his New Deal agricultural program. 
Millions of hogs had been destroyed earlier in the year as part 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, and millions of acres 
of corn plowed under in an attempt to reduce supply, and thus 
prices. 21 As no immediate effects were seen by farmers, 
agitation ran high once again. Once again, a farm strike was 
called for, but this time, even Reno himself called for militant 
action to obtain cost of production. 
By this time, though, support for the Farmers' Holiday had 
diminished. Reno was asking more out of this strike with less 
support from farmers. Some scattered acts of violence were 
observed throughout the latter portion of 1933, with most of the 
activity centered on northwest Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. 22 
However, when the first corn loans were received (see discussion 
20 Shover, "Farmers' Holiday Strike", 196. 
21 B.H. Hibbard, "Will the Farm Bill Work?" Nation 137 (5 
April 1933): 366-377; "The Case For and Against the Farm Bill," 
Literary Digest (1 April 1933): 6; Gilbert C. Fite, "Farmer 
Opinion and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 37 (1950-51): 653-672; Van L. Perkins, 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act and the New Deal, 1933 (Berkeley: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965). 
22 
"Wisconsin's Milk Strike," Nation 136 (31 May 1933) : 598; 
Cedar Rapids Gazette, 5 November 1933, p.l; Herbert Jacobs, "The 
Wisconsin Milk Strikes," Wisconsin Magazine of History 35 (1951-
52): 290-294; A. William Hoglund, "Wisconsin Dairy Farmers on 
Strike," Agricultural History 35 (1961): 24-34. 
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in Chapter 3), most of the revolts ended. 
The fact that hostilities ended so rapidly after the 
government began its aid programs to farmers points out a glaring 
fact: the farm revolts of 1932-1933 as seen by most of the 
farmers who participated in them were directed at getting some 
sort of help, not at gaining cost of production guarantees or any 
other legislative agenda, as Milo Reno believed. The stated 
activities of the FHA were not what drove the farmers to action, 
and Reno went to the grave in 1936 feeling his efforts had been 
in vain. In actuality, though, the farm revolts had accomplished 
what most farmers had wanted all along. 
THE FARMERS' HOLIDAY ASSOCIATION IN EASTERN IOWA 
Previous Studies and Methodology 
12 
Much of the previous literature about the Farmers' Holiday 
Association has focused on its activities in western Iowa and 
eastern Nebraska. 23 However, to the author's knowledge, no 
documentation of the activities of the FHA and the farm revolt in 
the eastern part of the state has been done. While the 
activities which occurred in eastern Iowa may not be as important 
as those which occurred elsewhere, for historical purposes they 
need to be documented. In addition, the fact that the movement 
was not as successful in the eastern portion of the state leads 
to the question of why. This study set out to document events of 
the Farmers' Holiday Association in eastern Iowa, and examine 
some possible reasons why movement was less popular. 
Because the focus area of the study was the eastern part of 
Iowa, I wanted to choose a source that would cover the greatest 
part of the region and be counted on to report FHA activities as 
completely as possible. I chose the Cedar Rapids Gazette as the 
main source for my research. The paper had a circulation area 
which covered the entire eastern third of the state, and had a 
reputation for complete reporting of events. 
Each issue from April 1, 1932 through December 31, 1933 was 
analyzed, and any reference to the Farmers' Holiday Association 
or the farm revolts was noted. No statistics were figured; 
rather the emphasis was on documentation. 
23 See note 19 and bibliography for details. 
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FHA and Farm Revolt Activities in Eastern Iowa, 1932-1933 
The first mention of the FHA came on April 28, 1932, as the 
Farm Union called a "Holiday" meeting in Des Moines for 3 May. 
One day earlier, a Holiday meeting at Walker in northern Linn 
County attracted 100 farmers. 24 On 2 May, a survey of Farm 
Bureau members in Cedar County found that 60 percent did not 
favor a farmers strike. 25 Further articles through the month of 
May reported on the activities of the FHA in organizing a 
possible strike. 26 
By early summer of 1932, some organization was underway in 
Eastern Iowa. Organizational meetings took place in Walker on 4 
June and in Center Point on 7 June. Other efforts took place at 
Atkins in Benton County, Anamosa in Jones County, Earlville in 
Delaware County, What Cheer in Keokuk County, and Hawkeye in 
Fayette County. 27 Milo Reno spoke to a crowd of 250 at 
Monticello in Jones County on 19 June. 28 A crowd estimated at 
3,000 attended a "Farm Holiday Picnic" in What Cheer on 4 
July. 29 The 10 July Gazette reported Farmers' Holiday 
10. 
24 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 28 April 1932. p. 14. 
25 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 2 May 1932, p. 9. 
26 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 4 May 1932, p.11; 12 May 1932, p. 
27 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 3 June 1932, p. 13; 7 June 1932, p. 
11; 15 June 1932, p. 13; 20 June 1932, p. 10; and 28 June 1932, 
p. 13. 
28 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 20 June 1932, p. 10. 
29 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 6 July 1932, p. 11. 
14 
Association organizations in 14 townships in Linn County. 30 
News of the planned Holiday faded a bit during the latter 
half of July, with the exception of an article quoting Jesse D. 
Sickler, the secretary of the Iowa FHA, on what exactly "cost of 
production" really meant. 31 On 1 August, the Farm Price Index 
was reported to have jumped 5 points over the past month. 
Ironically, this was just a day after Milo Reno announced that 
the Holiday would commence on 15 August and last for 30 days. 32 
Further meetings took place during the first weeks of 
August. A more important one took place on 6 August at Vinton. 
Glenn Miller, the head of the Iowa Farmers Union, addressed a 
crowd of more than 100 farmers, and urged them to fight for the 
right to withhold farm products. 33 
When the farm strike of 1932 commenced on August 8 in Sioux 
City, it was reported that there had been "nary a ripple" in the 
flow of farm products in eastern Iowa. More importantly, hog 
receipts in Cedar and Clinton Counties, areas thought to have 
high concentrations of FHA activity, actually had higher 
receipts. 34 
30 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 10 July 1932, p. 7. 
31 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 20 July 1932, p. 10. 
32 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 31 July 1932, p. 7; 1 August 1932. 
p. 8. 
33 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 7 August 1932, p. 7. 
34 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 8 August 1932, p. 22; for further 
information on previous hostilities in Cedar County, see Frank D. 
Dileva, "Frantic Farmers Fight Law," Annals of Iowa 32 (October 
1953): 81-109. 
15 
As the milk strike continued to heat up in western Iowa, 
activity in eastern Iowa remained scattered through the middle 
portion of August. The market in What Cheer reported very little 
in the way of produce coming in during the second week of August. 
However, the creamery reported no change in receipts. Stanwood 
in Cedar County reported just one less load of hogs to due to the 
Holiday. The creamery in Traer (Tama County) reported that only 
five of its 600 customers were participating in the withholding 
movement. While organizational meetings continued in other 
locations such as Grinnell and Malcom in Poweshiek County, and 
Clutier in Tama County, no violent actions related to the Holiday 
were reported. 35 
Active picketing did come to eastern Iowa in the latter part 
of August. Black Hawk County saw some of the most violent 
activity. On 16 August, a small group of Holiday sympathizers 
threatened to shut down the Parsons Creamery near Waterloo. The 
sheriffs were called in and the crowd was dispersed. 36 A week 
later, 25 pickets were arrested at a creamery near Cedar Falls. 
Active picketing continued in Black Hawk County until 30 
August. 37 Any possibility for a milk strike in Cedar Rapids was 
averted on 29 August, as the price paid to farmers for milk was 
35 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 10 August 1932, p. 8· 12 August I 
1932, p. 20; 13 August 1932, p. 3; 14 August 1932, p. 7; 15 
August 1932, p. 10. 
36 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 17 August 1932, p. 13. 
37 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 24 August 1932, p. l· 30 August I 
1932, p. 1. 
16 
raised from $1.40 to $2.00 per pound. 
Cedar County also saw Holiday-related activities, with 100 
pickets centered in the rural area around Tipton. These farmers 
began their pickets at 8:00 a.m. on 29 August. A clash later 
that day between the pickets and deputies resulted in 11 injuries 
and caused the strike to be called off. 38 Other trouble 
developed in Clinton County. As many as 500 holiday supporters 
established a blockade just west of Clinton which resulted in 5 
arrests on 31 August. This uprising also was short-lived due to 
the quick release of the prisoners and the ending of the general 
withholding movement on 1 September. 
Reports continued about the violence in the vicinity of 
Sioux City, while tensions appeared to calm down in eastern Iowa. 
Scattered Holiday meetings took place, but no large-scale protest 
movements were reported. In fact, farmers got some good news, as 
farm product prices continued to rise slightly, and the largest 
corn crop in Iowa's history was being projected. 39 
Deeper into the month of September, very little Holiday 
activity was reported in eastern Iowa. Again, scattered pockets 
of organization were reported (Marengo, Iowa City), but no 
withholding of produce was reported in eastern Iowa. Meanwhile, 
other parts of the country were being threatened with farm 
strikes of their own. 
38 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 29 August 1932, p. 1; 30 August 
1932, p. 1. 
39 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 9 September 1932, p. 13; 10 
September 1932, p. 5. 
Gradually, news of the elections of 1932 replaced the 
activities of the Farmers' Holiday Association out of the 
newspaper. Any violent activities associated with the farm 
revolts were occurring elsewhere, especially in Minnesota. 4 0 
17 
News of the FHA did not appear again until the fall of 1933. The 
19 September Gazette reported that the FHA was to hold a 
convention with 2,500 to 3,000 members expected to attend. Milo 
Reno was pushing hard for cost of production assurances in the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA) Code being proposed. 41 
Additionally, the FHA was looking for guarantees of a mortgage 
refinancing bill and the payment of soldier's bonuses. Without 
these pledges, Reno promised a new strike. 
By October, things again were beginning to heat up. 
Although the directors of the FHA decided to indefinitely delay a 
general strike on farm produce, President Roosevelt was getting 
concerned. The 20 October Gazette carried the headline 
"Roosevelt to Act At Once to Halt Farm Strike". 42 On that same 
day, the Hardin County United Farmers Organization, a radical 
offshoot of the Farmers' Holiday Association, called for an 
embargo on all livestock and grain until higher prices were 
attained. 43 
4° Cedar Rapids Gazette, 12 October 1932, p. 1. 
41 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 19 September 1933, p. 1, 12; 23 
September 1933, p. 3. 
42 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 20 October 1933, p. 1. 
4 3 ibid. / p. 1 7 . 
By 22 October, a general farm strike had been declared in 
six states of the Upper Midwest. Little effect was seen 
18 
initially in eastern Iowa. In fact, in the 10-day period leading 
up to this second strike, corn prices rose 13 cents, up to 35 
cents per bushel. That was 3 and 1/2 times more per bushel than 
in October of 1932. 44 
By this time, the Farmers' Holiday Association was beginning 
to lose what little control remained. A splinter group known as 
the Farmers' National Committee For Action was calling for active 
pickets starting 15 November. At the same time, an "anti-
Holiday" group known as the Farmers Move Against the Strike was 
gaining ground. This organization was beginning to take members 
away from the FHA. As Milo Reno began losing control, his 
actions became more and more desperate. He told his followers to 
be prepared to "throw the strike into full gear" if Roosevelt 
rejected his cost of production idea. 45 
While violence erupted again in the vicinity of Sioux City 
on November 5, talks were underway in Cedar Rapids between the 
milk producers and distributors to avoid any sort of trouble. 4 6 
Eventually, another agreement was reached to keep the price of 
milk up at the Cedar Rapids Creamery. 
Several incidents did occur in eastern Iowa during the 
44 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 25 October 1933, p. 1. 
45 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 27 October 1933, p. 1; 2 November 
1933, p. 12; 4 November 1933, p. 1. 
46 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 7 November 1933, p. 1. 
middle part of November. On 10 November, a former Waterloo 
policeman fired several revolver shots over the heads of 
picketers near Denver in order to disperse the crowd. 47 
19 
Even scarier incidents occurred in Cedar and Clinton 
Counties. On 14 November, over 100 farm pickets stopped a truck 
driver carrying a truckload of poultry to Chicago outside of 
Clinton. The driver was escorted back to Clarence. 48 On the 
16th, nearly 100 deputies were called out to disperse a crowd of 
over 100 pickets, resulting in 13 arrests. This action followed 
the actions of the mob a day earlier, when trucks were stopped, 
had their tires punctured, and were pelted with bricks. 
Fortunately, no serious injuries occurred. 49 
Later on 16 November, a warehouse owned by the Toronto 
Creamery burned to the ground. Three local FHA activists were 
later tried and convicted of setting fire to the building. On 
the 20th, a Milwaukee Railroad bridge between Wheatland and Big 
Rock burned. 50 
However, just as suddenly as tempers had flared, the 
tensions calmed down, this time for good. Partially responsible 
for the easing of tensions was the formation of so-called "Law 
and Order Leagues" all around Cedar and Clinton Counties. Over 
47 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 11 November 1933, p. 1. 
48 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 14 November 1933, p. 1. 
49 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 17 November 1933, p. 2. 
5° Cedar Rapids Gazette, 20 November 1933, p. 1. 
20 
100 farmers formed such a group in the vicinity of Bennett. 51 
However, the largest reason hostilities ended was the corn 
loan. On 24 November, the first corn loan was received in Iowa. 
Under the program, farmers received money in order to put their 
corn into a crib, which was sealed. This loan was to be repaid 
at 4 percent interest, but if the farmer defaulted, all he lost 
was the cribbed corn, which was unsalable. If the price of corn 
rose significantly, the farmer could then sell the corn and repay 
the government loan while keeping the difference in profit. 52 
Almost instantly, farmers attitudes changed, as for the 
first time they saw the possibility for economic relief which 
could be obtained within twenty-four hours of application. 53 
Further legislation followed, as the Iowa legislature enacted a 
moratorium on foreclosures. The creation of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation to ensure bank deposits truly signaled the 
end of the farm revolt in eastern, and indeed all of Iowa. 54 
51 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 22 November 1933, p. 14. 
52 For a detailed explanation, see Frank D. DiLeva., "Attempt 
to Hang an Iowa Judge," Annals of Iowa 32 (July 1954): 361. 
53 ibid, 362. 
54 ibid., 364. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Analysis 
It is obvious that the activities of the Farmers' Holiday 
Association in eastern Iowa were sporadic and scattered in 
nature, especially when compared to what took place in western 
Iowa, eastern Nebraska, and even Wisconsin and Minnesota. What 
are some possible reasons why this episode of farm revolts did 
not affect this region, while at the same time the movement was 
so active in surrounding areas? 
One factor to consider is the weather. 1932 saw nearly 
21 
average rainfall across the state, with the glaring exception of 
very dry Plymouth and Woodbury Counties on the western edge of 
Iowa. Eastern Iowa precipitation ranged from 25-40 inches, with 
the driest totals centered on the counties of Jones and Iowa. 
Maybe even more importantly, the eastern portion of the state was 
spared from the worst of the severe weather during the year. A 
major hailstorm caused $1,000,000 damage to crops, buildings, and 
other properties in a line from Plymouth to Sac County. Many 
corn crops in the vicinity of LeMars and Cherokee were stripped 
bare and considered a total loss. 55 Not coincidentally, these 
two communities were centers in the farm Holiday movement. 
1933 saw near normal rainfall again in the east, with yearly 
totals ranging from 25-35 inches. However, western Iowa saw a 
significant drought which affected corn yields significantly. 
55 United States Department of Agriculture, Weather Bureau, 
Climatological Data, Iowa Section 42 (Washington, D.C.: 1932), 
99-100. 
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Woodbury, Monona, Crawford, and Harrison were the driest 
counties, each with less than 17 inches of precipitation for the 
year. To make matters worse, western Iowa suffered through 
record-breaking heat in June and July. Once again, eastern Iowa 
was spared the brunt of the severe weather, with a significant 
hail event striking the northwest quadrant on 19 June. 56 
While one cannot cite weather conditions as the only factor, 
it is obvious that eastern Iowa had a much more favorable climate 
than the rest of the state through the main period of farm 
insurgency. Farmers who didn't have to worry about their crops 
probably weren't as concerned with low prices. At least they had 
some sort of crop to harvest despite the price. 
Another variable involved the incidence of farm 
foreclosures. Woodbury, easily the site of more Holiday activity 
than any other county, had three times more foreclosure suits 
pending than any other Iowa county. With the exception of Black 
Hawk County, no other eastern Iowa counties had an excessive 
number of foreclosures. 57 This led reporter Bruce Bliven to 
write in the New Republic that "it's where the farmers had 
something a few years ago and have had it suddenly taken away, 
that the agitators find a responsive audience. 11 58 
56 United States Department of Agriculture, Weather Bureau, 
Climatological Data, Iowa Section 43 (Washington, D.C.: 1933), 
99-100. 
57 Des Moines Register, 15 July 1934. 
58 Bruce Bliven, "Milo Reno and His Farmers," New Republic 
77 (November 29, 1933): 64. 
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Yet another factor to be considered deals with political 
leanings. Eastern Iowa was considered the most conservative 
portion of the state, politically speaking. By looking at the 
county-by-county breakdowns of presidential election votes for 
1920-1932, it is obvious that the two most conservative counties 
in the state were Linn (Cedar Rapids) and Polk (Des Moines). 
Even in the election of 1932, in which Democrat Franklin D. 
Roosevelt defeated Republican and favorite son Herbert Hoover, 
Linn and Polk counties decided for Hoover, bucking the trend of 
the rest of the state (Black Hawk, Story, and Warren were the 
only other counties to cast a majority of votes for Hoover) . 59 
An article in the Gazette of 23 October confirms this. 
Hoover won a straw poll among eastern Iowa readers of the paper . 
As the article states, "Cedar Rapids is in the center of one of 
the most conservative sections of Iowa, at least under normal 
circumstances, and the section in predominantly Republican. " 60 
Repeated editorials in the Gazette in the weeks leading up to the 
election endorsed Hoover. 
Other editorials in the Gazette were highly critical of the 
Farmers' Holiday Association. On August 6th, 1932, an editorial 
entitled "Stay At Home - Sell Nothing" stated that the strike 
would be interesting to watch, but that the prospects for success 
didn't seem bright. It stated that the strike could only work if 
59 Alice V. McGillivary and Richard M. Scannon, America at 
the Polls: 1920 - 1956 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 
1994), 256-261. 
6° Cedar Rapids Gazette, 23 October 1932, p. 1. 
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it was conducted on a large scale, which wasn't likely. 61 
Evidently, that fact was lost on everyone but Reno and the 
diehard members of the FHA. An editorial the next day raised the 
quest i on of why the strike had been delayed until buying power 
was so low that the probability of success for the strike was 
great 1 y reduced. 62 
After the strike had been in progress for a couple of weeks, 
the Gazette conceded that attention had been raised, but not 
prices. 63 Yes, the strike had garnered attention, "but after 
that, farmers have no specific remedy for their problems." A 
plan should have been formulated which everybody agreed upon 
before arousing the sentiment of the public, which has to pay for 
the relief. 64 Later in the month of August, the paper commended 
dairy interests in Cedar Rapids for averting a milk strike. 65 
Editorial opinion became even more negative in September, 
especially in reference to Milo Reno. The paper questioned the 
action of the pickets in ignoring an order by Reno to stop, 
saying it would "preclude any possibility that the movement will 
achieve constructive results". Reno was accused of being a 
professional organizer profiting from the farmer's distress. The 
editorial went on say that the forces of protest were too loosely 
61 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 6 August 1932, p. 4. 
62 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 7 August 1932, p. 7. 
63 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 20 August 1932, p. 4. 
64 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 23 August 1932, p. 8. 
65 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 31 August 1932, p. 6. 
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bonded that the movement would never succeed in withholding a 
sufficient amount of produce to effect an improvement in general 
price levels. 66 The paper even went so far as to suggest an 
alternative to the Holiday. It argued that restaurants should 
increase the portions served in order to get rid of agricultural 
surpluses. 67 
By September of 1933, editorial opinion of Reno had not 
changed. "Reno thinks he is the only one who knows what to do 
about the farm problem. 11 68 "Reno covets power ... and feels that 
violence is a means of achieving personal power. " 6 9 An October 
21 editorial stated that conditions in the region were not good, 
but were better than in some other sections of the state. The 
paper endorsed the Agricultural Adjustment Act, asserting that 
under the AAA option, farmers could receive a cash "bonus", and 
prices for hogs and corn might go up. Under Reno's plan, 
everything was a gamble, and no cash was in store for the 
immediate future. 70 
Favorable weather, a highly conservative political base, and 
scathing editorials in the major daily paper of eastern Iowa 
certainly can be seen as contributing factors to the lack of 
activity in eastern Iowa. In addition, the general farm 
66 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 4 September 1932, p. 6. 
67 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 11 September 1932, p. 6 . 
68 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 6 September 1933, p. 6. 
69 ibid. 
70 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 21 October 1933, p. 4. 
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community in eastern Iowa was not behind a strike. 
The Gazette ran a series of interviews with farmers 
throughout eastern Iowa in the months leading up the election of 
1932. The anthology was known as "What's What Out on the Acres". 
More often than not, the subject of the Farmers' Holiday came up 
during the course of the interview. 
Overwhelmingly, the attitude of the farmers was against any 
sort of withholding movement. Even from inception, many eastern 
Iowa farmers were not in favor. E.L. Stewart of Washington 
called the Farmers' Holiday, " ... as big a piece of foolishness as 
ever has been suggested." 71 Many farmers felt that the movement 
could not stick together because of the independent nature of 
farmers. 72 Omar Yoder of Sharon Center stated that "Farmers are 
too scattered, too diversified, and not enough think alike. " 73 
Another farmer felt that the strike would be ineffective unless 
the Grange and Farm Bureau joined. 74 
Other concerns were focused on how farmers who were already 
going through difficult times could survive a farm strike. "What 
about those who can't meet their obligations today?" said one 
71 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 6 May 1932, p. 13. 
72 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 17 May 1932, p. 11; 12 September 
1932, p. 10. 
73 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 28 June 1932, p. 13. 
74 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 27 September 1932, p. 11. 
27 
farmer; others expressed similar sentiments. 75 Others stated 
that they would join the strike if everyone else did, but they 
doubted that would happen. 76 Many farmers realized that the 
idea of holding produce off the market to raise prices wouldn't 
work, and could cause more harm than good. 77 Ed McMillan 
maintained that the strike could call attention to the plight of 
the farmer, but not accomplish much more than that. 78 For a few 
farmers, the concern seemed to be more on tax reform than on 
higher prices. 79 
Summary 
The Farmers' Holiday Association-sponsored strikes of 1932 
and 1933 saw very little activity in eastern Iowa, despite 
extensive activities in the western portion of the state. 
Weather conditions, the political structure of the region, and 
unfavorable press coverage of the FHA and Milo Reno all are 
possible reasons for the relative lack of activity in eastern 
Iowa. Public opinion towards the farm strikes was negative, 
75 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 15 July 1932, p. 13; 18 July 1932, 
p. 8; 20 July 1932, p. 10; 26 August 1932, p. 20; 1 September 
1932, p. 14; 7 September 1932, p. 8; 23 September 1932, p. 13. 
76 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 19 July 1932, p. 10; 27 July 1932, 
p. 12. 
77 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 22 July 1932, p. 22; 9 August 1932, 
p. 12; 8 September 1932, p. 8; 27 September 1932, Section 2, p. 
8; 18 October 1932, p. 13. 
78 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 13 October 1932, p. 12. 
79 Cedar Rapids Gazette, 27 September 1932, Section 2, p. 8; 
24 October 1932, p. 10. 
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especially among farmers. All of these factors were likely 
responsible for the relative quiet which existed in eastern Iowa, 
while farm revolts were going on all around them. 
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